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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the protests in February 2014 in 
Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. While these protests 
resulted in the resignation of local governments, the 
elections that followed suggest a continuation of ethno-
nationalist politics. This research explains how the 
characteristics that defined the collective identity of the 
protest movement are undermined over time and how 
this, together with a lack of strategy, created a negative 
climate for mobilization at the time of the cantonal 
elections, October 2014. Hereby, this research shows that 
while Dayton is often seen as the major obstacle, internal 
factors also influence attempts at democratization and 
political reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The legacy that was left by the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has been defined  by ethno-nationalism. 
The ethnicized political discourse has been said to be the 
continuation of war by other means.[1] The Dayton 
peace accords that ended the violence in 1995 was 
marked by a democratization strategy that leaned on the 
institutionalization of ethnic divisions.[1]  The country 
was divided into two entities, both with their own 
government: the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska). The Federation 
is furthermore divided into ten cantons and the Republika 
Srpska into seven regions. Besides this division, the 
country also acknowledges a national government with 
three rotating presidents: a Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim), a 
Bosnian Serb and a Bosnian Croat. The success of ethno-
nationalistic political parties is seen as the biggest 
obstacle in democratization and the Dayton process.[1] 
 However, one city is often characterized by the 
relative absence of ethno-nationalism: the city of Tuzla 
in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[2] Even during 
the war, there were initiatives by civilians to prevent or 
combat ethno-nationalism.[2] However, the division in 
cantons had as a consequence that Tuzla canton was 
often governed by parties that were elected by the more 
conservative and ethnically homogeneous countryside. 
While this may explain why the popular Bosniak party 
SDA (Party of Democratic Action) has governed Tuzla 
for many years, the multi-ethnic SDP (Social democratic 
Party) did get most of their support since 1990 from 
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Tuzla-city.[3][4] This is not strange, considering that 
Tuzla has been a multi-ethnic city since before the war, 
while other cities have become more ethnically monotone. 
Furthermore, Tuzla today still has an active citizen’s 
movement.[5] 
This active citizen’s movement was very present 
when in February 2014 protests against corruption and 
privatization were initiated in Tuzla-city.[6] These 
protests, also referred to as the Bosnian Spring, quickly 
resulted in the resignations of several cantonal 
governments, after which people organized themselves 
through plenums, certain citizen’s meetings, and put 
forward a new expert government.[7][8][9] Though while 
this protest movement started strong, the movement 
slowly declined after the expert government was appointed 
and when new elections were held in October 2014, again 
the ethno-nationalist SDA was elected.[10] This leads us 
to the question why the protests in February 2014 weren’t 
able to have more influence on the cantonal elections in 
October. The protests were estimated to have the biggest 
effect in Tuzla and the city’s multi-ethnic history could 
have provided a positive climate for political change.[4] 
To answer this question, the protest movement will 
be analysed through three phases, each describing a certain 
changing point for the movement. The first phase 
describes the start of the protests and the resignation of the 
cantonal government in Tuzla. The second phase involves 
the creation of plenums. The third and final phase revolves 
around the appointment of the expert government and the 
elections in October 2014. Within these phases, three 
concepts were used to analyse the mobilization within the 
movement: leadership, collective identity and repression. It 
has been argued that leaders play crucial roles in the 
mobilization of social movements. They can stimulate 
unity and resist repression by enemies.[10] The second 
concept is chosen because a strong collective identity can 
stimulate commitment.[11][12] At last, repression can take 
on different forms. In this case, repression was present in 
the form of framing and the targeting of leaders. The term 
framing refers to a communication technique whereby 
subjects (people, organizations, events or otherwise) are 
being described in such a way that it links those subjects 
(implicitly) to certain values or characteristics. The goal is 
to let the audience make certain associations with the 
described and form an opinion based on these associations. 
These concepts will be analyzed through 
secondary sources related to the protests, interviews and 
statements from relevant actors. 
 
PHASE ONE: ERUPTING PROTESTS 
The first phase surrounds the events from February 5th, when 
the protests started, until February 7th when the cantonal 
government resigned and the protests calmed down. 
 The protests were initiated by some of the (former) 
employees of the factories named Dita and Polihem.[13] 
These factories were among the many companies in Tuzla 
that were privatised after the war  and who’s bankruptcy 
resulted in unemployment. The (former) employees had 
been protesting for some time but didn’t seem to have the 
capacity to mobilize larger groups.[14] The privatization 
measure is often described as having failed and being one 
of the factors that stimulated the large unemployment rate 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is almost 30% in total and 
more than 60% among youth.[15] Because this matter of 
unemployment is an issue that is felt within all groups in 
Bosnian society, it provided a strong base for what would 
later bring thousands of people to the streets of Tuzla.[16] 
 The mobilization stage of social movement is often 
regarded as one of the moments where leaders play a 
crucial role.[12] Bosnian academic Asim Mujkic describes 
the protest movement as one which is actually 
characterized by its lack of official leadership.[17] While 
the movement indeed did not put forward one official 
leader, some aspects of the leadership function were 
fulfilled within the movement. The (former) employees of 
the closed factories in Tuzla fulfilled for example an 
initiating and symbolic role. Then several local 
organizations got involved by facilitating mobilization 
within their own networks. This mobilization of existing 
networks is one of the three necessary conditions to 
successfully mobilize social movements.[12] Furthermore, 
two conditions are deemed crucial: (1) historical change or 
events to create political opportunities and (2) the 
development of cognitive liberation among the aggrieved 
population, which moves people from apathy into 
action.[12] In the case of Tuzla the bankruptcy of the 
factories served as the historical change or event. The 
‘cognitive liberation’ clearly seemed to be present when 
reading statements from the individuals involved.[18] 
This idea of cognitive liberation also coincides 
with the narrative of Tuzla’s active civil movement 
throughout history. So while we established that there was 
no leader to cultivate support and loyalty, the movement 
did establish a certain collective identity. According to 
Mujkic this was the evidence of a new division, which 
shifted from a division between ethnicities to a division 
between the agents and objects of ethno-political 
entrepreneurship.[19][17] This new ‘class’ was, according 
to Mujkic, characterized by a shared discontent about the 
political and economic situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Mujkic states that this lack of leadership was part of their 
tactic to distance themselves from the ruling political 
discourse, in which leadership is often ethnicized.[17] 
 Mujkic’ theory is not completely irrelevant, when 
looked at repression tactics of the political elite in Tuzla. 
Collective identities often provoke resistance and the 
protest movement in Tuzla was no exception.[13] Most 
nationalist parties framed the protests in such a way that it 
seemed like their supporters was targeted. The SDA for 
example framed the protests as ‘anti-bosniak’.[20] The 
local authorities furthermore described the protestors as 
terrorists.[21] While this ethnicized rhetoric is not unusual 
in Bosnia, some say it was intensified because of the 
upcoming elections.[22] 
The protests, however, quickly turned violent, 
which only played into the frame constructed by politicians 
and authorities.[23] By naming the protesters ‘terrorists’ 
they delegitimized the protest movement and legitimized 
repression.[24] According to an annual report from Human 
Rights Watch, the police in Tuzla used disproportionate 
violence against the protesters.[25] The authorities also 
targeted people who helped organize the protests, which is 
an often used tactic in counterinsurgency.[26][27][14] 
However, the targeting of prominent individuals within the 
protest movement only seemed to strengthen the support for 
the movement and its collective identity.[12][28][29] 
 From this chapter, it can be concluded that while the 
protests were initiated by a select group of people, it was 
suddenly picked up by several networks and initiators and 
from thereon grew bigger very quickly. Mobilization 
therefore mainly went through existing networks and 
structures. The narrative of solidarity was very present and 
the protest movement was heterogenic in terms of socio-
economic background and ethnicity. Through this narrative 
of solidarity a certain collective identity was formed. This 
was strengthened by the short term success of the protests – 
the resignation of the local government – which gave the 
movement a sense of power. Furthermore, the lack of 
official leadership placed the movement outside of the 
political spectrum which prevented corruption by political 
repressors. The authorities and political parties did try to 
delegitimize the movement through means of framing but 
this only strengthened the collective identity and, according 
to Mujkic, stimulated a new division between civilians and 
elite. 
 
PHASE TWO: FORMING PLENUMS 
The second phase of the protest movement starts February 
9th when the first plenum was organized and ends on the 26th 
of March when the expert government was appointed.[30] 
 The plenums in Tuzla were organized by some 
scholars from the Philosophy Faculty from Tuzla University 
and were used to formulate more concrete goals now that the 
cantonal government had resigned. A plenum can be 
described as a people’s assembly and can be seen as a form 
of direct democracy in which everyone can make proposals 
and vote on specific issues.[31] The demands and proposals 
that followed from each plenum were sent to the cantonal 
parliament but were not always implemented.[30] 
Nevertheless, the plenums did prove to be popular. 
Approximately 700 people attended the meetings, not 
including around 2400 people that followed the debates 
online.[32] The plenums successfully organized 
participation and mobilization and functioned as a legitimate 
communication outlet of the protest movement. 
 The idea of a leaderless movement was even more 
emphasized in this second phase of the movement. To 
prevent any hierarchy within the plenums, there was a new 
moderator chosen for each meeting.[33] By not putting 
forward any representatives, the movement prevented any 
collaboration with the government and thus ‘any possibility 
of appropriation by the corrupted regime’.[17] However, the 
initial organizers of the plenums were often on the forefront 
in the media. It is clear that in this phase the initiators were 
actually more distinct even if they did not want to be seen as 
leaders themselves.[30] 
The creation of the plenums further developed the 
frame of self-determination. Mujkic describes this process 
as citizens becoming aware again of their power and the 
possibilities to articulate demands and interests.[34] A clear 
distrust of the traditional political structure was expressed. 
Furthermore, the way the plenums were set up also gave the 
movement more legitimacy, which made it harder for 
governmental actors to delegitimize and prosecute them. 
 The three conditions for mobilization that were 
described in the first phase were also met in the second 
phase. The resignation of the cantonal government served as 
historical change or momentum while the existing networks 
from the first phase were still present. Furthermore, the 
strengthened idea of self-determination only stimulated the 
cognitive liberation. 
 This second phase thus revolves around the 
transformation of the movement from chaotic protests to 
an organized and democratic structure. The plenums 
stimulated a certain legitimacy which made repression less 
valid. Also, the collective identity of the movement was 
strengthened by its sense of self-determination. The 
movement still stayed away from the traditional political 
structures. Though while the movement didn’t put forward 
any official leader, the initiators of the plenums could be 
seen as the informal leaders of the group. The election of 
the expert government changes this, however, and will be 
discussed in phase three. 
 
PHASE THREE: EXPERTS AND ELECTIONS 
The expert government was elected March 26th. All 
candidates were expected to distance themselves from any 
political affiliation and abstain from participating in the 
upcoming elections. Bahrija Umihanic, professor at Tuzla 
University and former SDA member, was chosen as the 
expert premier of Tuzla canton.[3] However, from the 
moment of appointment, the attendance at the plenums 
slowly started to decline. 
 In May 2014 this decline was shortly interrupted 
when there were massive floods in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia and Croatia, which affected almost one third of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, killed 25 people and dislocated 
around 90.000.[6][35] This disaster, however, prompted 
new solidarity and participation within the protest 
movement, for which the plenum provided a base.[26] Just 
like events in earlier phases, this disaster served as the 
historical change to stimulate mobilization. The perceived 
apathy of the Bosnian government only strengthened their 
idea of self-determination in this case. 
 However, after the floods participation within the 
protest movement continued to decline. This was probably 
also explained by the way the plenums were set up. It cost 
people a lot of time and energy to keep attending every 
meeting. Furthermore, the expert government lost support 
because it ‘hadn’t done enough’ according to some.[36] 
Besides, the movement didn’t have any strategy for the 
upcoming elections.[30] 
 Appointing the expert government undermined the 
political structure of the plenums. The changing of political 
structures can actually affect the resonance of certain 
frames.[37] In this case, that meant that the collective 
identity, which can also be seen as (part of) a certain 
collective action frame, that was constructed in the 
beginning of the plenums was undermined when the expert 
government was appointed. People accepted the leadership 
of Umihanic and the plenums became irrelevant. This 
weakened the frame of self-determination and direct 
democracy and explains the decline in participation. 
 As discussed, the movement is defined by a distrust 
against political institutions that are dominated by ethno-
nationalism.[17] This distrust is also illustrated by the low 
turnout at the elections in 2014, namely 54,14%.[38] 
Furthermore, the media had been under influence of 
political parties, which could have had a compromising 
effect on the elections.[39] 
 Though while politicians continuously influenced 
the media, there was no sign of significant repression 
during this phase. This can perhaps be explained by the 
decline in participation within the protest movement. As 
explained in phase one, a very present collective identity 
can provoke resistance and repression.[13] In this phase, 
however, this identity had lost its resonance and thus 
provoked less resistance. 
In the end, the outcome of the elections didn’t differ 
much from earlier years. The SDA won on both the cantonal 
level in Tuzla and on the national and Federation level. The 
multi-ethnic SDP turned out to be the biggest loser in 2014, 
with its amount of votes more than halved compared to 
2010.[10] While the economic and political problems can 
not only be attributed to the SDP, it were the officials from 
the SDP that had to resign in several cantons after the 
protests.  
To conclude, this last phase reveals the decline of the 
protest movement. The decline in participation had several 
causes. Self-determination was an important part of the 
collective identity of the movement but was undermined 
when power was handed over to the expert government. 
Furthermore, the expert government was perceived as 
inadequate, which prompted dissatisfaction. However, by 
the time the elections arrived, the movement had no strategy 
or momentum to remobilize or otherwise intervene. 
 
CONCLUSION 
At the start of this paper a main problem was 
introduced. Why didn’t the protests in February 2014 have 
more influence on the outcome of the cantonal elections in 
Tuzla, October 2014? To answer this, three phases within 
the lifespan of the protest movement were identified and 
this led to a twofold answer.  
 First of all, the collective identity that was formed 
in the first two phases were defined by a lack of official 
leadership and self-determination. These characteristics 
were not coincidental, rather, they were crucial to the 
success of the movement in the first two phases of protests 
and plenums. However, when the expert government was 
elected, both the frame of leadership and self-
determination were undermined. Secondly, the movement 
tried to distance itself from the traditional political 
institutions but also didn’t form a strategy for the 
upcoming elections. This resulted in the inability to 
remobilize or intervene at the time of the elections. In the 
answers of our main question it became clear that the 
concepts of collective identity, leadership and repression 
tended to interact with each other and affect short term 
mobilization and long term participation. 
 The Dayton peace accords institutionalized and 
legitimized the ethnic division in both politics and society. 
While international organizations keep investing in 
democratization and reconciliation efforts, Dayton often 
seems an insurmountable obstacle. The goal of this paper 
was not to undermine this issue but rather to show that 
there is more to be considered when analysing 
democratization efforts or reform. In this case study, one 
of the biggest obstacles turned out to be the collective 
identity and strategy of the protest movement itself. This 
teaches us not to get stuck on the Dayton dilemma but to 
look further into internal and external factors, as has been 
done in this paper. 
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